International carbon markets operate as follows: countries that have difficulty meeting their emission reduction targets under their national climate plans (known as “fixed national contributions” or NPNs) or seek to reduce less costly emissions can purchase emission reductions from other nations that have already reduced their emissions more sharply than they promised , for example, through renewable energy. If the rules are properly structured, the result can be a win-win situation for all concerned – both countries are meeting their climate commitments, the surplus is rewarded financially to go beyond, finance the country that generates emissions reductions and take a step forward in the world to avoid catastrophic climate change. The resolution of Article 6 is the most important item on Cop25`s agenda. But failure is a perception traditionally avoided by the UN, police hosts, national governments and certain components of civil society. If things migrate until 2020, you expect a Madrid fudge to be born. This could be done in the form of a “partial closure,” in which some differences of opinion will be declared consensual with a closer discussion for 2020. The final mechanism of Article 6 for “non-market approaches” is less precisely defined, but it would provide a formal framework for climate cooperation between non-trade countries, such as development assistance. Article 6.4 also specifies that the COP will ensure that a “share of revenue” “helps developing countries, which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, to cover adaptation costs” (and to “cover administrative costs”. Article 6 is one of the least accessible and most complex concepts of the global agreement. This complexity was one of the main reasons why Article 6 was adopted only on the last morning of the Paris negotiations in 2015 and was not resolved during last year`s climate talks in Katowice. Putting these rules in order is essential to combating climate change: according to their structure, Article 6 could help the world avoid dangerous levels of global warming or deter countries from making significant emission reductions. The integrity of the Paris Agreement and the countries` climate commitments are on hold.
This short text contains three distinct mechanisms of “voluntary cooperation” within the framework of climate targets: two on the basis of markets and a third on “non-market-related approaches”. The text describes the requirements for the parties involved, but leaves the details – the “regulatory framework” provided for in Article 6 – undecided. “ensures that a portion of the revenue from activities under the mechanism under paragraph 4 is used to cover the costs of adapting administrative expenditure and to assist parties to developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.” The issue of accounting for emission reductions transferred under Article 6.4 remains a major problem. The soundness of the accounting rules is essential so that emissions reductions cannot be counted more than once (double counting) and that the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement is preserved. Another sensitive point is how to deal with quotas produced under the Kyoto Protocol and whether countries can use them under the Paris Agreement. There was no agreement on the introduction of royalties to support adaptation measures, as was the case under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In the face of these and other disputes, the parties postponed the Article 6 decision until the Glasgow climate change conference. Article 6.2 allows countries to conclude bilateral and voluntary agreements on trade in carbon units. Therefore, there is disagreement as to whether – and if so, how – the many methods to stem the K era